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Diversity in Television's Speech:
Balancing Programs in the
Eyes of the Viewer
Richard Schiro*
Through regulation, the Federal Communications Commission has
endeavored to provide diversity for viewers of the broadcastingmedia.
Regulation has been approved by the courts as a valid means of providing the diversity which is necessary to preserve free speech in cormpliance with the first amendment. Examining the various rationales
justifying the regulation of broadcasting,the author concludes that the
regulations thus far promulgated have failed to provide that diversity.
He then proposes a new technique to provide more successfully for
the desired first amendment diversity.
I.

INTRODUCrION

AMENDMENT doctrine as formulated by the Supreme
FIRST
Court has never accorded absolute protection to all speech.
Not only does the government retain some power to regulate the
time, place, and manner of speech, but some speech, such as obscenity, may be regulated because of its content.1 Such strictures
generally apply to all of the various means of expression, 2 although

the application is not identical to all.3

This recognition of in-

trinsic differences among the media is most consistently and broadly
applied in the courts' willingness to allow, without finding any

violation of the first amendment, greater regulation of broadcasting
than of other means of expression.

4

* Assistant Professor, Law Department, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania. B.A. (1964), Trinity College (Conn.); J.D. (1968), University
of Chicago. Admitted to the Arkansas and Pennsylvania Bars.
1. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4-11 (1965).
2. Note, Filthy Words, The FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating
Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. Rev. 579 (1975).
3. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952); Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-88 (1969);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943);
see Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and
Print Media, 26 HASTinGS L.J. 659 (1975).
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Yet despite the courts' reiteration of broadcasting's uniqueness,5
broadcast regulation has remained an issue of fervent debate6 and
extended litigation7 for years. Regardless of how narrowly a regu5. Chief justice Burger has dearly stated his view that the uniqueness
of the broadcasting medium limits its first amendment freedom. An Interview
with Chief Justicq Burger on the Judiciary and the Press, 61 A.B.A.J. 1352,
1353 (1975).
6. See Baran, On the Impact of the New Communications Media Upon
Social Values, 34 LAw & CoN~ranp. PTOB. 244 (1969); Barrow, The Attainmernt of Balanced ProgramService in Television, 52 VA. L. REV. 633 (1966);
Bryant, Historical and Social Aspects of Concentration of Program Control in
Television, 34 LAw & CoNTmdp. PRou. 610 (1969); Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1959); Cox, The FCC's Role
in Television ProgrammingRegulation, 14 VL.. L. REv. 590 (1969); Crandall,
The Economic Effect of Television-Network Program "Ownership", 14 J. LAw
& EcoN. 385 (1971); Fisher, Program Control and the Federal Communications Commission: A Limited Role, 14 VIL. L. REv. 602 (1969); Goldberg,
A Proposal to Deregulate Broadcast Programming,42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 73
(1973); Greenberg & Barnett, TV Program Diversity-New Evidence and
Old Theories, 61 Am. EcoN. REv. 89 (1971); Jaffe, Program Control, 14 VILL.
L. REv. 619 (1969); Johnson, Freedom to Create: The Implications of Antitrust Policy for Television ProgrammingContent, 1970 LAw & SOCIAL ORDER
337; Kalven, Broadcasting,Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw
& EcoN. 15 (1967); Kramer, An Argument for Maintaining the Current FCC
Controls, 42 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1973); Levin, Program Duplication,
Diversity and Effective Viewer Choices: Some Empirical Findings, 61 Am.
ECON. REv. 81 (1971); Loevinger, The Issues in ProgramRegulation, 20 FED.
Com. B.J. 3 (1966); Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness and Fiduciary Duty in
Broadcasting,34 LAw & CoNTans. PrOu. 278 (1969); Pierson, The Need for
Modification of Section 326, 18 FED. Com. B.J. 15 (1963); Robinson, The
FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MwNi. L. REv. 67 (1967); Sweeney, Regulation of
Television Program Content by the Federal Communications Commission, 8
U. RICH. L. REV. 233 (1974); Comment, Diversity in Television Program
Content: A Proposalfor Sustaining Programming, 7 CoLum. J. LAW & SocIAL
PRoB. 319 (1971); Note, The Fairness Doctrine and Entertainment Programming: All in the Family, 7 GA. L. REv. 554 (1973); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HArv. L. REv. 701 (1964); Comment, Impact of
Quality Programming on FCC Licensing, 23 LA. L. REv. 85 (1962); Comment, We Pick 'em, You Watch 'em: First Amendment Rights of Television
Viewers, 43 S. CAL. L. Rmv. 826 (1970); Comment, The Wasteland Revisited:
A Modest Attack Upon the FCC's Category System, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 868
(1970).
7. Surely one of the most litigated broadcasting cases in recent years is
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 44 F.C.C. 2d 1027 (1973), in which the
Commission first upheld a fairness doctrine complaint by Accuracy in Media,
Inc. because of an NBC broadcast entitled "Pensions: The Broken Promise."
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed that decision, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Then the Court of Appeals vacated
the panel's opinions and judgment and granted a rehearing en bane, id. at
1155, but later vacated its rehearing order, reinstated the panel's opinions and
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lation is drawn," or what element of the broadcasting industry is
affected thereby,9 the industry's rebuttal invariably analogizes
broadcasting's more regulated status to the print mediums freedom
from regulation, and concludes that the regulation in question unconstitutionally infringes on broadcasting's first amendment rights
and becomes thereby an impermissible means of achieving the
regulatory goal. 10 That goal, which underlies most of the Federal
Communications Commission's regulatory efforts, is to achieve by
active trading in the "marketplace of ideas" 11 the "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"' 2 debate in "a multitude of tongues"' 3
which the first amendment cherishes, seeks, and requires for its fulfillment.' 4 In a word, the goal is diversity.
To date the Commission has most often pursued diversity by
regulating public affairs programming,15 that type of speech which
the amendment is generally deemed to protect most assiduously.1 6

Regulation of broadcasting's two other major species of speech-

judgment, and referred the case to the panel for consideration of mootness
because of enactment of pension reform laws. Id. at 1156. The panel vacated
its original decision and remanded to the Commission with direction to dismiss on mootness grounds. Id. at 1180. Finally, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 96 S. Ct.
1105 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 484
(2d Cir. 1971).
9. For example, the family viewing hour concept adopted by the National
Association of Broadcasters was attacked on first amendment grounds in a lawsuit brought by a coalition of television actors, producers, and writers against
the three major networks, the NAB, and the FCC. BROADCASTmc, Nov. 3,
1975, at 25-26, Feb. 2, 1976, at 39, and July 19, 1976, at 25.
10. See, e.g., Cronkite, Introduction to Part II1, Points of Conflict-Legal
Issues Confronting Today, in MEDIA .AND = FrosT AMENDMNNT IN A FnU=
SocmrY 131, 133-35 (1973).
11. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
13. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
14. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
HAnv. L. Isv. 1641 (1967).
15. "Public affairs programs (PA) include talks, commentaries, discussions,
speeches, editorials, political programs, documentaries, forums, panels, round
tables, and similar programs primarily concerning local, national, and international public affairs." 47 C.F.R. § 73.670 Norn 1(d) (1975).
16. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). For a discussion of
the "public speech/private speech" theory of first amendment analysis, see
note 52 infra.
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entertainment programming' 7 and advertising ""-has been comparatively slight and ineffective.' 9 But to the extent there has been
entertainment programming regulation, it has likewise been under20
taken in the name of furthering first amendment diversity.
The thesis of this article is that effective utilization of the balanced programming regulations, which affect all television programming and not solely public affairs, has far greater potential for
realizing first amendment diversity than does regulation of only
preferred public affairs speech via the fairness doctrine and its
peers. 2' The latter method has far too limited a view of the potential for diversity in television programming. The present balanced
programming regulations, as written and implemented, are but lip
service to diversity: broadcasters can easily comply with their
modest requirements, and then can cloak themselves in the first
amendment as protection against demands for more effective regulations.
Part H of this article discusses the leading rationales for broadcast regulation which provide the bases for regulating television
programming in a constitutionally acceptable fashion. However,
as will be discussed, the regulatory doctrines so far developed by
the FCC pursuant to these rationales have failed to provide the
diversity sought by the first amendment. Part III proposes a new
technique-termed "average audience distribution" (AAD)-for better achieving such diversity.22 The basic premise of AAD is that

17. 'Entertainment programs (E) include all programs intended primarily
as entertainment, such as music, drama, variety, comedy, quiz, etc." 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.670 NoT l(b) (1975).
18. This article will not discuss regulation of broadcast advertising.
19. "The objections to the program quotas go more to the point that they
are futile than that they are dangerous ... . The requirements cannot serve
to raise the quality of programming; they can only serve to even out the
categories of mediocrity." Kalven, supra note 6, at 46.
20. "[The licensee] should reasonably attempt to meet all such needs
and interests ("of the public he is licensed to serve"] on an equitable basis."
Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission en bane Programing Inquiry,
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Programming Statement].
21. See text accompanying notes 60-69 infra. The wisdom and success
of the FCC's regulation of public affairs programming to achieve first amendment diversity is beyond the scope of this article. It has been amply discussed elsewhere, see e.g., Geller, The Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting:
Problems and Suggested Courses of Action (published by The Rand Corporation, R-1412-FF, 1973).
22. The Average Audience Distribution proposal is a method of achieving
meaningful program balance. It utilizes existing program categories and the
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diversity in television programming will be meaningful only if that
diversity reaches the average viewer. If the programs which provide programming balance are broadcast in the wee hours of the
morning, the average viewer sees none of them. Diversity can be
achieved only in the eyes of the viewer and not in the programming
23
schedule of the licensee.
II.

HIsToRY AND APP

cA tON OF THE

REGULATORY RATIONALES

A. Four Rationales
Ever since the Radio Act of 1912 first forbade operation of a
radio apparatus without a license, dispute has raged over what
grounds justify and legitimize governmental regulation of the use
of the electromagnetic spectrum by private parties. 24 The earliest
rationale for regulation was the necessity of allocating this scarce
resource among competing users. 25 This rationale has supported a
27
variety of regulations through the years 26 and is still viable today.
concept of percentage guidelines for broadcasting those categories. However,
it applies a new standard, "viewer hours"-the number of viewers per hour
who watch each program during a given period-for calculating balance
among program categories. Once a licensee's total viewer hours per month
are determined, that licensee, using its own discretion in scheduling, must allocate the percentages for each program category on the basis of viewer hours
rather than simply broadcast hours. For a complete discussion of the AAD
proposal, see text accompanying notes 91-107 infra.
23. The focus here will be on programming broadcast on the three
major networks principally during the prime time hours. For a definition of
prime time, see note 94 infra. While there is a noticeable need for originality
and diversity in syndication programming, which constitutes about 30 to 40
percent of a network affiliated station's broadcast time (almost none of it in
prime time), and about 90 percent of the broadcast time of nonaffiliated stations, an examination of the problems and economic forces in that market is
beyond the scope of this article. See generally Brown, "Mary Hartmane Series
Is Doing Well, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1976, at 58, col. 3; Off-network Shortage Called Mandate to Revise Traditional Ideas About Programming, BRoADCASTING,

Mar. 1, 1976, at 31.

24. For detailed discussions of the early history of radio regulation, see
Coase, supra note 6, at 1-7; Rosenbloom, Authority of the Federal Communications Commission, in FREDom AND REsPoNsmBrrY iN BR ADcASTc 96-170
(J. Coons ed. 1961).
25. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 282 (1933).
26. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
"Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited
facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not
available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike
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The Communications Act of 1934 utilized the "public interest,

convenience and necessity" language found in the earlier Radio
Act of 1927 and made it the applicable standard for allocation of
licenses both at the time of initial issuance 28 and at renewal. 29 Besides providing the standard for frequency allocation decisions,
the Act employed this language as an independent rationale for
creating, as distinct from applying, regulatory policies. 30 Thus, in
National Broadcasting Company v. United States,3 ' in upholding

the Federal Communications Commission's chain broadcasting regulations which were designed to reduce network power, especially
32
as realized through affiliation agreements with individual stations,
the Supreme Court held that the FCC's activities were not to be
confined to "finding that there are no technological objections to
the granting of a license,"33 but were to extend to "determining the
composition of that traffic" 3 in fulfillment of the public interest,
convenience, and necessity. The Court quoted language from the
Commission's Report on Chain Broadcasting which merged the two
rationales: "With the number of radio channels limited by natural
factors, the public interest demands that those who are entrusted
with the available channels shall make the fullest and most effective use of them." 3 5 Yet neither the Communications Act nor the
other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation." Id. at
226.
27. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969);
Mark v. FCC, 468 F.2d 266, 269 (1st Cir. 1972). For a rebuttal to the scarcity
argument, see Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcasting, 34 LAw & CoNTmM. PhoB. 278, 294-97 (1969).
28. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a), and 311(b) (1970).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. IV,
1974).
31. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
32. The Communications Act provides that "the Commission from time
to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall . . .
[h]ave authority to make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting ....... 47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1970).
33. 319 U.S. at 216.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 218. This public "trustee" gloss was promptly used by the
courts in McIntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 599 (3d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946), and by the Commission in its
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247
(1949). It is still current: "The scheme of the Communications Act is
clear. The broadcast licensee is a public trustee, given a limited license
which can be renewed by the Commission only if it is in the public interest
to do so." Dean Burch, Chairman, FCC, testifying at Hearings on Broadcast
License Renewal Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of
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Supreme Court provided guidelines for implementing this "public
interest."8 8 On the contrary, the Court noted in NBC, as it had
noted earlier,s7 the necessity for and benefit available from such
38
an unspecific regulatory standard.
As foreseen in NBC, the public interest rationale has been continuously applied to uphold the constitutionality of a broad range
of broadcasting regulations. 9 Despite this continuing viability,
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 58 (1973).
36. Professor Kalven subjected National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943), to intensive analysis in a memorandum for the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), subsequently published as Broadcasting, Public
Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 15 (1967). For him,
the opinion has a decidedly limited reach. In the decision's attempt to preserve the regulations challenged as unauthorized by the Communications Act
of 1934, "[tlhe concern is not with what the Constitution permits but with
what Congress intended." Id. at 42. The Court rejected the argument that
this intent was to limit the Commission to the assessment of financial and engineering data in issuing licenses and indicated that other criteria for issuance
and renewal may be considered, but it did not say what those criteria could
be. From this omission Kalven argued that "Ewihat he [Frankfurter] had in
mind and was addressing his generous language toward was nothing more
complex than the wasting of frequencies." Id. at 43. But, if the Court
were concerned only with that narrow question, could not the Commission
prevent that waste by confining its investigations to technical aspects of the
electromagnetic spectrums use?
While the Court in NBC did not specify what additional criteria were acceptable, it did say that, "Congress did not authorize the Commission to
choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social
views, or upon any other capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by
these regulations proposed a choice among applicants upon some such basis,
the issue before us would be wholly different." 319 U.S. at 226. Kalven
interprets this language to mean that something more than financial and
technical data may serve as criteria, but that the Court will not say what.
However, this interpretation finds too little in the language. The Court is
saying that, on the one hand, the Commission may consider other criteria
besides financial and engineering data, and that, on the other hand, it may
not consider applicants' "political, economic or social views" and may not
choose between applicants on "any other capricious basis." The Court has
t us stated the two extremities of consideration and is requiring the Commission to consider more than the first and less than the second. Nonfinancial
and nontechnical criteria which do not involve the proscribed views or "any
other capricious basis" will be tolerated, if not mandated. As Kalven noted,
balanced programming is a criterion which falls within these boundaries.
Kalven, supra note 6, at 45.
37. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
38. 319 U.S. at 219-20.
39. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(fairness doctrine); National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers and
Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975) (prime time access rule i);
Programming Statement (balanced programming).
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two more assertive rationales-the impact rationale and the affirmative-view-of-the-first-amendment rationale-have been used in recent years to support certain key, adopted or advocated regulations.
The public interest rationale inheres in both of these and supplies
their evolutionary base, but each is an independent rationale as
well. In contrast to the public interest standard, which frequently
affords no more than a handy label and an after-the-fact justification for certain regulations, these newer rationales define the public
interest by the nature of the regulations they seek and require for
their fulfillment.
The impact rationale, advanced with increasing frequency and
considerable conviction in recent years, maintains that the impact
of the electronic media, especially television, 40 is too potent to remain unregulated. 41 As data on the behavioral significance of television programming become more conclusive, the contention is
ever more widely espoused that, in the public interest, television's
content must be regulated.42 More than fifteen years ago it was
observed:
40. See, e.g., The People's Choice: TV is Voted Best Advertising Medium,
BROADCASTInG, Jan. 12, 1976, at 29 (by a large margin, adults consider television to be "the most influential advertising medium" and "also consider its
advertising the most authoritative, most up-to-date and most exciting");
Television: The More Medium, BRoADcAsTNG, Sept. 15, 1975, at 53 (increase
in the number of adults watching television and in the amount of time they
watch it with a decrease in the number of adults reading a daily newspaper).
41. Branscomb, The First Amendment As A Shield or A Sword: An
Integrated Look at Regulation of Multi-Media Ownership 104 (published
by The Rand Corporation, P-5418; 1975):
In summary, First Amendment theory will make much better sense
when we begin to recognize that it is not technological scarcity or
abundance nor even public ownership which justifies regulation of
the mass media. We regulate the mass media because they are
powerful and influential and because they are uniquely affected by
the public interest and because, if we do not, democracy as we
know it may not survive.
42. See generally T.Evrisor AS A SoCIAr FORCE: NEw APPROACHES TO
TV CarricisM (Aspen Institute ed. 1975). One commentator, after noting that
television newspersons as distinct from print media reporters were "themselves
... occasions [and] events," observed:
Thus it matters to the culture that Howard K. Smith will no longer
be co-anchorman with Harry Reasoner of the ABC Evening News....
These people mess around mightily with our consciousness.... They
are paid to be more than messengers: their celebrity is conferred
on them because they are our stand-ins -for life as it is botched outside our living-rooms. Superstars are supposed to behave super.
It's an obligation of stardom.
Cyclops, On the Metamorphosis from Anchorman to Superman, N.Y. Times,
May 25, 1975, § D, at 19, col. 1. Contra: "Broadcasting has at best an
incremental and at worst a marginal effect on political consciousness. Too
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[T]he question cannot be evaded whether this type of entertainment by de-civilizing-at-the-source, at work on a
hundred million people day by day, can fail to affect and
be affected by a public interest in maintaining civilization.
If so, this unintended education-in-reverse demands a type
of public attention which the media themselves [because
of their necessary preoccupation with the commercial aspects of the medium] are not in a position to furnish.43
The broadcast industry, 44 as well as the Commission and the
courts, 45 has begun to note and act upon 46 this increased concern
about the impact of television programs and advertising.
Each of these three regulatory rationales, scarce resource, public interest, and impact, was created to resolve the circumstances
of a particular time, but each has remained viable thereafter. The
scarce resource theory was imperative in the early days of broadcasting when a radio signal could travel but a few miles in the
high a price in administrative and judicial inefficiencies, or in broadcasting
revenues, should not be paid for doctrines designed to increase the number
of voices heard on the air." Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairnessand Access, 85 HARv. L. REv. 768, 771 (1912).
43. Hocking, Official Report for the Study of Radio and Television Network Broadcasting Before the Federal Communications Commission 1229-30
(1959), quoted in Bryant, supra note 6, at 611 n.3.
44. "'The consensus for free broadcasting in the United States is decreasing....
The people on both the left and on the right find much to be
disturbed about in that which we do." Arthur Taylor, then President of CBS,
speaking on a tape prepared by the National Association of Broadcasters and
quoted in BROADCASTING, Oct. 13, 1975, at 30. Mr. Taylor continued: "'I
think that places a very great responsibility on all of us to see the levels of
violence, the levels of obscenity, particularly in certain time periods, kept to
a very minimum. It's that kind of responsibility which will forestall the
legislative and regulatory pressures which I think we are all going to face

in the years to come."'

BROAMCASTING,

Oct. 20, 1975, at 33.

45. See address made in 1959 by then FCC Chairman John C. Doerfer to the
National Association of Broadcasters, quoted in Coase, supra note 6, at 37-38,
in which Doerfer observed that the FCC's regulatory power "stems from the
potential power inherent in broadcasting to influence the minds of men and
the concomitant scarcity of the available frequencies." In Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), the court observed: "The infinite potential of broadcasting to
influence American life renders somewhat irrelevant the semantics of whether
broadcasting is or is not to be described as a public utility." Id. at 548.
46. The best known recent instance of industry concern is the adoption
of the family viewing hour (FVH) by the National Association of Broadcasters. Debate as well as litigation continues on whether FVH is genuine
self-regulation by the industry or disguised FCC regulation. As to the litigation, see note 9 supra, and as to the debate, see, e.g., BROADCASTING, May
19, 1975, at 34-35.
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clogged airwaves, and it has remained useful to support a variety of
regulations for the greatly increased number of stations. The FCC
rationalized in the name of the "public interest" its regulatory
efforts aimed at curtailing the networks' threatened monopoly
domination of the industry, and has continued to use that language
in a wide range of regulations. 47 And the impact rationale becomes more cogent as doubts arise about the depth and breadth
of television's influence on our children and ourselves.
The affirmative-view-of-the-first-amendment rationale is a re48
latively recent addition and is also uniquely a product of its time.
The idea that the first amendment cherishes diversity and finds its
fulfillment in "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate is neither
new nor controversial. The Court has repeatedly applied it in a
range of first amendment cases.49 The novel permutation of that
47. "Congress moved [to enact the Communications Act of 1934] under
the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental control
the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the
broadcasting field." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137
(1940).
48. Two other rationales are available, although neither can be viewed
as uniquely derived from some timely circumstance. By analogy to public
utilities it can be argued that since a scarce resource is owned by the citizenry
(unlike the resources of many public utilities which are scarce but privately
owned) and licensed by the government to private entities for a limited
term (subject to renewal), the profits realizable by those private entities
from, this publicly owned asset should be limited by regulation. Professor
Coase believes that the necessary antecedent to regulation as a public utility
is "sale" of the airwaves to private owners, and that an appropriately high
sale price would have a decided impact upon the networks' and licensees'
high profits. Coase, supra note 6, at 22. Cf. the observations of former
FCC Commissioner Robinson in the context of comparative license renewal
hearings that "licenses do confer property rights.' The statutory theory
to the contrary.. . 'has been nullified by immemorial practice."' WESH-TV
Case Brings FCC's Comparative Procedures into Question, BROADCASTING, July
12, 1976, at 25.
The other rationale employs the Commission's power to regulate chain broadcasting, set forth in the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1970), as
the basis for regulating the networks directly. Such regulation would surely
have impact, since the licensees have almost wholly abdicated responsibility
for prime time programming to the networks. Programming Statement at
2314. Arguably, such regulation would have scant first amendment difficulty
since the networks are only within the amendments protective ambit to the
extent they hold broadcast licenses. There is precedent for this use of
Section 303(i): Bryant noted the "regulatory potential" of that section, Bryant,
supra note 6, at 619, and then discussed the prime time access rule as "a landmark in regulation of television networks... [because it] operates directly on
network organizations rather than on affiliate licensees as do the Chain Broadcasting Rules." Id. at 634.
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1976).
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idea is that the first amendment actually mandates this diversity
and, therefore, also mandates affirmative government action to
achieve it. As one leading proponent of the affirmative-view-ofthe-first-amendment stated: "[A] provision preventing government
from silencing or dominating opinion should not be confused with
an absence of governmental power to require that opinion be
voiced." 10 This rationale was the basis for seeking a right of paid
access to television in Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee.51 While the Court in CBS rejected
the access claim because of, among other things, "the risk of an
enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues," 5 2 it also indicated that some
"limited" formulation of the access concept might well be "both
practicable and desirable" 53 and presumably constitutional. But,
as discussed below, application of the affirmative-view-of-the-first50. Barron, supra note 14, at 1676. Compare Barron's statement with the
following: "[We are constrained to point out that the First Amendment forbids governmental interference asserted in aid of free speech, as well as governmental action repressive of it." Programming Statement at 2308.
51. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
52. Id. at 126. The Court's reference to "public issues" may be to the
Her system of first amendment analysis which, in Professor Meiklejohn's formulation, discerns two principal levels of speech-"public speech" and "private
speech."
The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured
to all speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or
indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal-only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of public interest. Private
speech, or private interest in speech, on the other hand, has no claim
whatever to the protection of the First Amendment. If men are engaged, as we so commonly are, in argument, or inquiry, or advocacy,
or incitement which is directed toward our private interests, private
privileges, private possessions, we are, of course, entitled to "due
process" protection of those activities. But the First Amendment
has no concern over such protection. . .. [W]e draw sharply and
clearly the line which separates the public welfare of the community from the private goods of any individual citizen or group
of citizens.
A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in POLrrICAL
FREEDOM, THE CONSTIr=rnONAL POWER OF THE PEOPLE 79-80 (1948).
The
public speech/private speech dichotomy is not a rationale for regulation. However, to the extent that certain forms of broadcast programming can be identified as private speech-a difficult task in itself-such programming arguably
can be more closely regulated without violating the first amendment because

it has reduced constitutional status. See also G. ANASTAPLO,

THE CONsTrru-

118 (1971); D. Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Supreme Court
Since New York Times v. Sullivan, 26 SmAcusE L. REv. 819 (1975). Contra,
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
53. 412 U.S. at 131.
TIONALIST
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amendment rationale need not be confined to the right of access
concept.
Regardless of which rationale is employed, the broadcasting
industry has insistently defended itself by litigation and comment
against any regulation which it deems an infringement of its first
amendment rights. FCC rulemakings are frequently tested in
litigation, and the industry's point of view is steadily espoused in
the literature 5 4 Despite these efforts, "the courts have consistently
55
sustained the authority of the FCC to consider programming."
The Commission has interpreted this consistency as providing a
firm mandate for diversity-motivated regulation: "The Supreme
Court, in its landmark decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC... gave considerable support to the principle that the FCC
could properly interest itself in program categories." 6
B. Application of the Rationales
The question, then, is how these rationales have been applied
to diverse questions involving programming. For the rationales
54. See, e.g., Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in

Broadcasting, 34 LAw & CONTEMP.

PROB.

278 (1969).

The author, a former

FCC Commissioner, endeavored to rebut the scarcity and public interest regulatory rationales but could cite no cases in support of his argument. Finally,
he conceded that "[the Court] has converted the responsibilities of broadcasting, with respect to information, into legal duties, and it has elevated these
duties to constitutional status. There can be little doubt that these principles
will be the law for a long time to come." Id. at 297 (footnote omitted).
55. Barrow, supra note 6, at 649. See also Minow, The Public Interest,
in FnE nom AND RESPONSmILITY IN BROAICASTING 15, 20-27 (J. Coons ed.
1961). A recent instance of FCC involvement in program content arose when
the Commission, in a memorandum opinion and order, reminded licensees that
they must take account of society's drug abuse problem and suggested ways in
which licensees could fulfill their public trustee obligations by not broadcasting
drug-oriented music. 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971). A challenge to the order on
first amendment and vagueness grounds failed. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
56. Action for Children's Television, 31 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1228, 1233
(1974). The FCC further observed in that ruling:
While the holding of the Red Lion case was limited to the fairness
doctrine, the Court's opinion has a signflcance which reaches far beyond the category of programming dealing with public issues ...
[The Court] stated... that "[i]t is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by the Congress or by the FCC." . . .
This language, in our judgment, clearly points to a wide range of
programming responsibilities on the part of the broadcaster.
Id. at 1234.
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have supported not only relatively narrow regulatory efforts such
as deceptive advertising,57 obscenity, 8 and lotteries,59 but also the
Commission's three central regulatory schemes for programming:
the fairness doctrine, equal time, and balanced programming.
1. Fairness Doctrine
The fairness doctrine inheres directly in the public interest
standard, and indirectly expresses the two more recent rationales.
As the Court noted in CBS: "Formulated under the Commission's
power to issue regulations consistent with the 'public interest,' the
doctrine imposes two affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster:
coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate and must
fairly reflect differing viewpoints." 60 Congress, in fact, amended
Section 315 of the Communications Act to recognize broadcasters'
responsibility "to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable oportumity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues
of public importance." 6' The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional validity of the doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
62
FCC.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its affirmative component, the
doctrine in practice demands so little that broadcasters are able
to "meet their fairness responsibilities through presentation of
carefully edited news programs, panel discussions, interviews, and
documentaries." 6" Therefore, to compel the adequate coverage
of important public issues which the fairness doctrine seeks but
apparently cannot achieve, the right of access doctrine was formulated.6 4 Just as the right of access evolved from the fairness
57. Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56

CoLum.

L.

REV.

1018, 1045-49

(1956).
58. "[T]he Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires, shall. ...[hlave authority to suspend the license of any
operator upon proof sufficient to satisfy the Commission that the licensee ...
has transmitted ... signals or communications containing profane or obscene
words, language, or meaning..... " 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D) (1970).
See Note, Filthy Words, The FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating
Broadcasting Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579 (1975).
59. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1975).
60. 412 U.S. at 110-11.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
62. 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969). For a full discussion of the evolution
of the fairness doctrine, see id. at 375-86; Geller, supra note 21, at 1-43.
63. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 186-87 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
64. Id. at 187.
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doctrine in pursuit of the "widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," 0 so the rationale
for access-namely, an affirmative view of the first amendmentevolved from the earlier public interest rationale.
2. Equal Time Rule
As set forth in Section 315(a) of the original Communications
Act of 1934, the equal time rule requires: "If any licensee shall
permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the
use of such broadcasting station"6 Since Section 315 applies to
major and minor candidates and to all air time, whether sold or
donated by the broadcaster, its passage resulted in great reluctance by broadcasters to provide any time for candidates.67 A 1972
amendment to Section 312(a) of the Act sought to overcome this
reluctance by creating as an additional ground for revocation of
any station license the "willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time
for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." 68
Although the original Section 315 was forged in the debate over
broadcasting's common carrier status, 69 its enactment was grounded
in the public interest rationale as well. And just as a new regulatory rationale supported the evolution of the right of access concept from the fairness doctrine, so that same rationale-the aTrmative-view-of-the-first-amendment-supports, the evolution of Section
315 to include the requirement of the 1972 amendment.
3. Balanced Programming
Although the Commission and the courts have long been involved in program-related discussions,70 the 1960 Programming
65. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
66. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
67. R.L. PEABODY, et al., To ENACr A LAw 14-18 (1972).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 47 U.S.C. §
312(a) (1970).
69. For a summary of the legislative history of the Act, see CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105-09 (1973).
70. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10
J. LAw & EcoN. 15 (1967); Rosenbloom, supra note 24, at 130-41, 155-70.
The FCC's earliest broad statement on program content was entitled PUBLIC
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Statement 71 was the Commission's major effort to deal comprehensively with television programming. In regard to fulfilling the
licensee's principal obligation to execute the "public interest, convenience and necessity" standard, the Commission found that:
The principal ingredient of such obligation consists of a
diligent, positive and continuing effort by the licensee to
discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of his
service area. If he has
accomplished this, he has met his
72
public responsibility.
This ascertainment requirement 7 s carries with it the obligation
that the licensee "should reasonably attempt to meet all such needs
and interests on an equitable basis." 74 In an effort to provide
guidance for the fulfillment of this requirement, the Commission
specified fourteen programming categories which it deemed to be
"It]he major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest,
needs and desires of the community in which the station is located
as developed by the industry, and recognized by the Commission
. The Programming Statement has been implemented by
the requirement that the licensee's program log 76 contain "[a~n
entry classifying each program as to type, using the definitions set
forth in Note 1 at the end of this section." 77 Note 1 defines eight
program types, each of which corresponds to a program category

SERVICE RESPoNsmLrY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES

(1946), popularly known

as the "Blue Book."
71. Programming Statement supra note 20.
72. Id. at 2312.

73. The ascertainment process was more fully developed by the Commission in its Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971), and in the recent revisions of the ascertainment process entitled Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 41 Fed. Reg. 1372 (1976).
74. Programming Statement at 2314.
75. Id. The fourteen categories are "(1) Opportunity for Local SelfExpression, (2) The Development and Use of Local Talent, (3) Programs for
Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5) Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs, (7) Editorialization by Licensees, (8) Political Broadcasts,
(9) Agricultural Programs, (10) News Programs, (11) Weather and Market
Reports, (12) Sports Programs, (13) Service to Minority Groups, (14) Entertainment Programming." Id.
76. The program log (47 C.F.R. § 73.670 (1975)) is to be distinguished
from the operating log (47 C.F.R. § 73.671 (1975)) and the maintenance
log (47 C.F.R. § 73.672 (1975)).

77. 47 C.F.R. § 73.670(a)(1)(iii) (1975).
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listed in the Programming Statement.7 8 Programming balance is
required among the categories.
In setting forth categories the Commission believed it was (1)
avoiding any difficulty with the first amendment and Section 326
of the Communications Act,79 which bar the Commission from conditioning "the grant, denial or revocation of a broadcast license
upon its own subjective determination of what is or is not a good
program," 80 and (2) simultaneously dealing with the practical
considerations which bar the "Commission's role ... [from being]
one of program dictation or program supervision." 81 Further, the
Commission
78. Of the five Programming Statement categories unnamed in Note 1,
one-weather and market reports-is subsumed under the Note's definition
of news program. 47 C.F.R. 73.670 NoTE 1(c) (1975). Two other categories in the Programming Statement-opportunity for local self-expression,
and development and use of local talent-are not program types for Note 1
purposes, apparently because they are not content-related designations. But
their importance as indicia of a primary programming goal of the Commission
is accounted for by the requirement that the log must note the source-local,
network, or recorded-for each program. 47 C.F.R. § 73.670 (1975). See
R. Nor.L, M. PECK & J. McGowAN, ECONoMIc ASPECrS oF TELEWIsioN REGULATION 97-120 (1973) [hereinafter cited as EcONOMIc ASPECTS].
The Programming Statement's "service to minority groups" category is omitted from the program regulation, but is increasingly the subject of independent activity and concern by and before the Commission. The fifth Programming Statement category omitted from the log regulations is children's programs, but this program type is subject to continuing discussion and rulemaking
by the Commission and interested parties. For example, in 1974 the Commission applied the balanced programming concept to this one category by
ruling that: "In the future, stations' license renewal applications should reflect a reasonable amount of programming designed to educate and inform
children, and not simply to entertain. Broadcasters are not necessarily expected to have programs designed to cover every subject or field of interest."
Action for Children's Television, 31 P & F RADiO REG. 2D 1228, 1228-29
(1974). In addition, while the Commission follows a licensee's balance in nonentertainment programming by means of the Annual Programming Report,
38 Fed. Reg. 28773-801 (1973), children's programming is the subject of a
separate question in the license renewal application form. 38 Fed. Reg. 28797
(1973).
79. This section provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or
construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." 47
U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
80. Programming Statement at 2308.
81. Id. at 2309. "As for the question whether the FCC should consider
the quality of programming within a category, or seek to set minimum standards
of quality, I think that is nearly impossible." Cox, supra note 6, at 595.
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emphasized that these standards or guidelines should in no
sense constitute a rigid mold for station performance,
nor should they be considered as a Commission formula
for broadcast service in the public interest. Rather they
should be considered as indicia of the types and areas of
service which, on the basis of experience, have usually been
accepted by the broadcasters as more or less included 8in2
the practical definition of community needs and interests.
Although the Programming Statement's fourteen categories have
been translated into the details of the FCC's day-to-day regulatory effort, in actuality little has been accomplished toward realizing balance in television programming. Despite a reluctance to
foster balance by requiring percentages for various program categor83
ies or even recommending some desirable ratio among categories,
the Commission employs minimum percentages as an administrative
tool,8 4 requires that program percentages be stated in the Annual
Programming Report,8 5 and usually speaks in percentages when
assessing merits and demerits for programming in comparative
license renewal decisions.8 6 But this limited "counting" or tabulation of program diversity has not been undertaken to foster diversity; it has been adopted solely for administrative ease. In sum,
"[tihe agency has never informed the regulated industry of its responsibilities-has never set out guidelines or criteria as to what is
expected of the licensee concerning even the most basic allocations
goals such as local or informational programming." 8 7
82. Programming Statement at 2313.
83. See discussion of specified program percentages in note 92 infa.
84. The Commission recently revised its guidelines for minimum acceptable
percentages of nonentertainment programming by commercial TV licensees.
Effective Oct. 1, 1976, a television licensee should broadcast "five percent
total local programming, five percent informational (news plus public affairs)
programming, [and] ten percent total non-entertainment programming." 41
Fed. Reg. 20169, 20170 (1976). A similar but less specific rule applies to
commercial AM and FM licensees. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281 (a)(8)(i) (1973).)
More noteworthy for purposes of AAD, this recent revision for televison provides that "the percentages and the comparisons for programming are to be
based upon the period 6:00 a.m. to midnight .... Programs designed to meet
community needs may be offered whenever they reasonably can be expected
to be effective.... We believe that expectation is higher before midnight than
in the early morning hours thereafter." 41 Fed. Reg. 20170 (1976) (citation
omitted). This new timing provision represents an acknowledgement by the
Commission of the problem the AAD concept is designed to correct.
85. 38 Fed. Reg. 28793 (1973).
86. See, e.g., RKO Gen., Inc. (KHJ-TV), 44 F.C.C.2d 123, 130 & n.22
(1973).
87. Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process in Television: Problems and
Suggested Solutions 43 (published by The Rand Corporation, P-5253, 1974).
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The result is that the balanced programming regulations have
not moved the licensee toward a reasonable attempt "to meet all
such needs and interests ["of the public he is licensed to server]
on an equitable basis." s8 The task remains of restructuring these
regulations in order to achieve diversity while simultaneously preserving the first amendment rights and profit-seeking needs of the
broadcasters. The average audience distribution proposal is designed to accomplish that goal. Just as the right of access concept
evolved from the fairness doctrine, 9 and the requirement of the
1972 amendment evolved from Section 315 9 0 -both of these evolutions being premised on the impact and affirmative-view-of-thefirst-amendment rationales (as well as a view of the public interest)
-so the average audience distribution proposal has evolved from
the balanced programming regulations and is likewise premised
on these two rationales (and the public interest).
III.

JROGRAmMIG BALANCE SHouLD BE IN
= Eys OF THE VmwER

A. The Average Audience Distribution Proposal (AAD)
The two most frequently stated proposals for improving the
effectiveness of the balanced programming concept are (1) to divide
the entertainment programming category into subcategories and
require some balance among those subcategories, 9' and (2) to re88. Programming Statement at 2314.
89. See text accompanying notes 60-65 infra.
90. See text accompanying notes 66-69 infra.
91. Perhaps the most common criticism of the balanced programming regulations is that the monolithic entertainment category encourages uniformity
and mediocrity rather than diversity in programming. Co; The FCC's Role
in Television Programming Regulation, 14 Vux.. L. REv. 590, 595 (1969);
Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw &
EcoN. 15, 46 (1967). The suggested cure for this is to create subcategories
for the various types of entertainment fare and then- to require some balance
among those subcategories. Note, Regulation of Program Content by the
FCC, 77 HARv. L. REV. 701, 705 (1964); Comment, Impact of Quality Programming on FCC Licensing, 23 LA. L. REv. 85, 103 (1962); Comment, The
Wasteland Revisited: A Modest Attack Upon the Category System, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 868, 889 (1970).
This cure is meritorious. In first amendment terms, it is but a logical extension of the constitutionally acceptable balanced programming regulations.
Creating entertainment subcategories acknowledges the incontrovertible monotony of present entertainment programming and seeks to change this in pursuit of first amendment diversity. A similar process has been pursued for the
prime time access rule without constitutional objection. National Ass'n of In-
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quire licensees to program certain minimum percentages of each

program category. 92 While each of these suggestions refines the
dependent Television Producers and Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 539-40
(2d Cir. 1975). Administratively, logging more program types is certainly
possible for the licensees; indeed, the A.C. Nielsen Company compiles data
for 36 program types, most of which are entertainment subcategories. See
Nielsen National TV Ratings Report, Oct. 2, 1975, at C.
The idea's weakness stems from the manner in which it is usually propounded. For example, former FCC Commissioner Kenneth A. Cox observed in
1969 that, "[w]ithin the entertainment category I would like to create a
subclass of more serious entertainment fare." Cox, supra. Limiting the subcategory idea to fostering "serious" fare has two drawbacks. First, in political
terms, if the proposal is a means to "highbrow" entertainment, its defeat is ensured-the broadcasting industry has assiduously argued that such programming is financially disastrous because of its meager audiences. U.C.L.A.L. REV.
supra, at 876 n.32. The FCC is unlikely to compel licensees to diversify only
into unprofitable programming.
Second, entertainment programming's diversity potential is greater than can
be achieved by the limited injection of serious fare into the present uniformity.
The content of some highly popular entertainment programs has become more
complex and significant in recent years because of the social and political issues
raised. See H. NEwCOMB, TV: Ts-s Mosr PopuzLa ART 211-42 (1974);
U.C.L.A.L REv., supra, at 882. Subcategorization should acknowledge this
diversity and provide an incentive to develop it further. Many additional entertainment programming ideas are suitable for creating diversity. For example, music as entertainment is almost wholly confined to radio; yet it is
surely a possible source of television programming diversity, and not solely
in the classics. The primary obstacle to diversity within the entertainment
category is the networks' follow-the-leader mentality for program selection.
See Stein, A Never Failing Formula for TV, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 6,
1976, at 24, col. 6. Regulations which create entertainment subcategories and
foster balance among them are a technically feasible, constitutionally permissible, and highly advantageous way to counteract that mentality.
92. Amending the balanced programming regulations to require that licensees broadcast certain minimum percentages in the various categories, particularly local and public affairs programming, has been a recurring recommendation. The issue of percentages is central to the debate over what standards
will apply in the comparative renewal hearing process between competing applicants for the same license. If the standards for acceptable and, therefore,
renewable service by a licensee are stated in terms of percentages, as was
suggested by then FCC Chairman Burch in the 1973 hearings on the license
renewal bill, Hearings on Broadcast License Renewal Before the Subcomm.
on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1121, such percentages may become
the sole renewal criterion, and any licensee who fulfills that criterion will be
unchallengeable on other grounds, however egregiously poor its service may
have been. See Goldberg, A Proposal to Deregulate Broadcast Programming,
42 CEo. WAsH. L. REv. 73, 84 (1973). As noted earlier, the Commission already informally uses percentages for administrative reference purposes. See
note 84 and text accompanying notes 84-86 supra. The issue of the use of
percentages in the license renewal process has been stirring since the issuance
of the Commission's Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings,
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requirements for programming balance, and each serves as an element in the average audience distribution proposal (AAD), neither
of them individually can promote effective balance. The reason
is that neither goes to the critical weakness in the balanced programming regulations. The fact is that, in the pursuit of maximum
audiences, licensees can achieve the minimal programming balance
now required by scheduling the requisite diversity in odd hours
throughout the seven broadcast days in the composite week.93
Since most television viewing is in the early evening and prime time
hours, 94 the viewer sees entertainment programming almost exclusively. Whatever balance exists in the broadcaster's schedule is
meaningless. If programming balance is to have any significance
and impact in promoting first amendment diversity, it must foster
diversity in the eyes of the viewer, in what the viewer sees rather
than merely in what the licensee broadcasts.
Refining the second proposal to require that certain percentages
of various program categories be broadcast in prime time 9 5 over1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965), and seems likely to conclude with a Commission
statement establishing qualitative, rather than quantitative, performance
standards for comparative renewal proceedings. For a complete history of this
topic, see H. Geller, supra note 87.
93. The composite week provides the statistical base for programming performance in three categories: news, public affairs, and all other programming
exclusive of entertainment and sports. These data are stated in terms of minutes
of operation and percentage of total operating time for various segments of
the broadcast days in the week, and is submitted by the licensee to the Commission in the Annual Programming Report. The particular week which is
selected to be the composite week is announced by the Commission in mid-fall.
38 Fed. Beg. 28773-78, 28792-93 (1973).
94. "Prime time" is subject to varying definitions. The prime time access
rule applies to the period 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. (except for the Central Time
Zone). Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir.
1971). The FCC's Annual Programming Report designates the period from
6 p.m. to 11 p.m. as one of its broadcast day segments, and refers to it as "the
early evening and prime time hours." 38 Fed. Beg. 28793 (1973).
95. Although it appears that no one to date has proposed a mechanism
as comprehensive as average audience distribution to achieve program balance
in the prime time hours, the idea of requiring the broadcasting of certain program categories in prime time has been raised. For example, one commentator,
in questioning the usefulness of comparing the percentages of time allocated
by licensees to the different program categories in determining program balance,
observed: "Percentages alone reveal nothing about the precise timing of any.
program; five percent of discussion in prime time may reach more people
than ten percent at less desirable times. A requirement that the reports [submitted by licensees at renewal time] show what percentages in the different
categories were broadcast in prime time would make the analysis more meaningful." Note, HARv. L. REv., supra note 91, at 705. "It is entirely appro-
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comes, at least theoretically, this critical deficiency in the effectiveness of the balanced programming regulations. However, since
most nonentertainment diversity programming lacks mass appeal,
whatever gains are made in content diversity due to these mandated
prime time programs will be quickly lost by the diminished viewing audience. This approach fails to incorporate an incentive to
overcome the industry's conviction that most of such programming
cannot attract a large and thus profitable audience. Because mandating diversity in prime time does not insure a viewing audience,
licensees will be compelled to absorb the financial loss produced by
this unprofitable prime time programming. In view of the possibly
devastating impact of this loss, it can be safely assumed that the
FCC would not enact such a requirement. In contrast, the AAD
proposal avoids this financial loss. Under AAD the licensee, able
to fulfill the balanced programming requirements more quickly
with fewer broadcast hours devoted to such less profitable programs, is motivated to upgrade nonentertainment programming and
schedule it (as well as certain less popular, more cultural entertainment programs) in prime time in order to attract maximum audiences.
The average audience distribution proposal shifts the focus for
measuring program balance from percentages of the licensee's broadcast time to percentages of the viewer's viewing time. Since first
amendment diversity is meaningful only when the viewer sees it,
the logical unit of measurement for such balance is viewer hoursthe time spent by the viewer watching television. Under AAD, a
licensee computes the total viewer hours achieved by its broadcasting during a certain time period, for example a month, and
then schedules the various program categories in proportion to the
total hours computed in order to achieve programming balance.

priate to include in the preferred time a representative amount of mass appeal
programming. But the public interest is not served adequately unless cultural
and public affairs programming is also included." Barrow, The Attainment
of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 VA. L. REv. 633, 657 (1966).
See also Cox, supra note 91, at 596; Johnson, Freedom to Create: The Implications of Antitrust Policy for Television Programming Content, 1970 LAw
& SOCIAL ORDER 337, 374. For a discussion of the FCC's adoption of a similar
stance, see note 84 supra.
96. This idea that viewers are numbers to be parceled among various shows
has arisen previously but in a different context. In an article tracing the evolving relations between advertisers and networks in regard to program control,
Stanley E. Cohen, Washington editor of Advertising Age, noted that advertisers did not mind losing program control in exchange for minimizing the
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AAD's unique ingredient is its built-in incentive for broadcasters to foster diversity and their own profits simultaneously.
Since the number of viewers for prime time entertainment programming is so vast, any diversity achieved within prime time, and
thereby in the regular television diet of the average viewer, will
have significantly greater impact, even if broadcast for a shorter
period of time, than will larger amounts of diverse programming
97
scattered in the least-watched portions of the broadcast schedule.
Since the percentages for purposes of programming balance under
AAD are measured in viewer hours rather than in broadcast hours,
the more popular a particular show becomes, the more quickly a
licensee is able to fulfill its balance quota in that program category.
The show's popularity means that the requisite number of viewer
hours for that program category 'will be accumulated quickly,
thereby freeing other portions of the broadcast schedule for profitmaximizing entertainment programs. The proposal is best illustrated by the following hypothetical.
Assume that a particular station, based on its signal's contours,
is found to reach a market of 750,000 television households. Its
ratings9 8 and audience share 99 for programs broadcast in that
risks of sinking a huge portion of their advertising budgets into particular programs which might fail and produce negative viewer reaction to the advertiser.
"To eliminate the identification of advertisers with programs . . . [some]
advocates suggested that TV sell the advertiser gross numbers of viewers,
rather than specific time periods. Commercials would be placed at the discretion of the broadcaster until the advertiser received the total number of exposures he had purchased." Apparently advertisers resisted this "magazine
concept" and continued to purchase time in specific programs because "[ulnless
the advertiser could buy a specific program, he could never be sure he was
reaching the audience he had in mind." Cohen, The Advertiser's Influence In
TV Programming, 1970 LAw & SociAL ORDER 405, 411-12. Cf. Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), on
the question of newspaper publishers' control over advertising placement. See
also Peterman, The Structure of National Time Rates in the Television Broadcasting Industry, 8 J. LAw & EcoN. 77, 83-93 (1965) for a discussion of
licensee/network affiliation agreements which employ a formula similar to AAD
to calculate the accumulation of free hours which an affiliate must first give
the network each month before the network will begin to reimburse that
licensee for broadcast time.
97. See NCCB Campaigning for Weekly Hours of Network, Local Public
Affairs Shows, BROADCASTmG, Jan. 19, 1976, at 26: "The National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting has begun an effort to enlist groups across the
country in a campaign to obtain from television stations and networks one
hour of public affairs programming in prime time each week."
98. The Nielsen rating for a show is the number of total U.S. TV households tuned to the program during the average minute of its broadcast ex-
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market range from highly popular to rather unpopular. This licensee's viewer hours for a month-the number of hours that viewers
watch its signal-are calculated by totaling the program ratings
for a day's broadcasting and multiplying that total by 30 days. 100
Also assume that on Mondays from 8 to 9 P.m. the station's rating
is the equivalent of 150,000 viewers; from 9 to 10 P.M. its rating
represents 250,000 viewers; etc. 011 The total number of these
viewers for each broadcast hour in that day multiplied by 30 days
is that station's average audience for the month. Thus, assuming
that this station reaches an average of 125,000 viewers per broadcast hour that day, and further assuming an average broadcast day
of 16 hours, this station broadcasts 60 million viewer hours per
month. (125,000 viewers X 16 broadcast hours per day X 30 days =
60 million viewer hours per month.) With this number in mind,
the licensee must then broadcast the appropriate percentage of
viewer hours in each program category, thereby reaching the- requisite number of viewers and achieving balanced programming
for the month.10 2 For example, if the recommended (or required)
pressed as a percentage of the total. Nielsen National TV Ratings Report,
Oct. 2, 1975, at B. This number does not reflect the actual number of viewers
seated in front of each set. According to a recent report by the A.C. Nielsen
Co., the number of television homes in the United States will increase by 2.6%
from the 1975-76 year to the 1976-77 year, with the result that a "network
rating point will be worth 714,000 homes, as compared with 696,000 now."

714,000 to 1, BROADCASTiNG, Mar. 29, 1976, at 7.
99. In Nielsen terminology: "Share of Audience: Audience during the
average minute of the program, in percent of households using television at
the time of the program's principal telecast...
Nielsen National TV Ratings
Report, supra note 98. In other words, audience share is the percentage of
the total audience watching television at a given time which is watching the
particular show in question; it is not a percentage of the total potential television audience.
100. In AAD's implementation, the licensee would total the actual viewers
per hour (or half-hour) for each day, and then add the total viewers for each
day to determine the viewer hours for a month, rather than assuming a particular day to be average and multiplying that day's total viewer hours by 30.
These viewer data are already collected by the program rating services.
101. The Nielsen rating measures audience in terms of households rather
than viewers because it is easier to determine whether a set is on than how
many people are watching it. However, the term "viewer hour" is preferable
to "household hour" because it is more expressive of the first amendment interests involved in AAD.
102. The composite week now in use is an unacceptably brief balancing
period for applying AAD. Since AAD requires a finer tuning of its program
schedule by a licensee than do the present regulations, at least a month is
necessary to provide sufficient latitude to achieve success within the requirements of AAD while at the same time affording the licensee ample scheduling
flexibility.
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percentage for public affairs programming is ten percent of a licensee's viewer hours, then the licensee in this hypothetical must broadcast six million viewer hours per month of public affairs programs
in order to fulfill its balance requirements.
At this point the average audience distribution principle is applied to determine how the minimum of six million viewer hours
per month of public affairs programming will be broadcast. This
can be achieved by broadcasting public affairs for approximately
24 hours when the average audience for the station is 250,000
viewers (6,000,000 viewer hours -- 250,000 viewers = 24 broadcast hours), or by broadcafting 40 hours when the average audience
is 150,000 viewers (6,000,000 viewer hours -- 150,000 viewers = 40
broadcast hours). Of course, these hours may be spread over the
month in whatever manner the licensee chooses. More importantly
for AAD's built-in incentive, the six million viewer hours of public
affairs programming may be achieved by totaling widely disparate
audiences: one hour with an audience of 500,000, plus two hours
on another day with an audience of 50,000, and so on.
An important question is when a licensee's average audience is
to be computed. Although the time periods used now for computing
ratings will be inapplicable, the present method of determining
ratings can be retained for AAD purposes. The key is to encourage
licensees to provide the best possible programming in each category in order to attract the largest possible audience, thereby achieving the greatest possible diversity for the first amendment at the
greatest possible profit to the licensee. At the end of each month a
licensee can calculate viewer hours achieved for each program
category and thereby assess how well it has fulfilled its balanced
programming requirements. Since the pursuit of balance and
ratings is an ongoing process, in the succeeding month the licensee
will be expected to adapt its schedule in response to its successes
and failures in the preceding month. Of course, the realities of
program planning are such that month to month adaption will be
impossible. But whatever time frame is established by the Commission's AAD rulemaking, 03s the premise remains the same: licensees will be expected to make a good faith effort to narrow the gap
for each program category between viewer hours predicted prior
to broadcast and the reality of a category's audience each month.

103. The details of implementing the AAD proposal will be best developed
in hearings and comments submitted in connection with an FCC rulemaldng.
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One additional consideration remains. Under the present balanced programming regulations, the tabulation of programming
diversity which occurs is done more for informational and administrative purposes than for regulatory purposes.104 One reason for
this limited use of counting is that the Commission's initial foray
into specifying percentages for renewal purposes became entangled
in litigation on another issue arising out of the same rulemakdng. 1°5
Second, the Commission has apparently viewed the fixing of percentages as posing a conflict with the dictates of the anti-censorship
statement in the Communications Act. 0 6 In contrast to this present
regulatory scheme, AAD is premised on counting, but the counting
is fairer and more effective because the unit-viewer hours-truly
measures the diversity achieved. Whereas counting percentages of
broadcast hours for various program categories under the present
regulations yields little benefit because there is no guarantee that
audiences are watching the programs,'10 7 adoption of the viewer
hour tabulation required by AAD produces first amendment diversity benefits which easily outweigh any reservations stemming from
Section 326.
B. AAD's Built-in Incentive
The decision to ban common carrier status for broadcasting in
the Communications Act, 08 and thereby forego utility-like regulation of the industry notwithstanding the scarce resource rationale,1°9
meant that broadcasting would be a privately owned, profit-maximizing industry. It has remained relentlessly successful in that
effort to the present day." 0 Consequently, the realities of broadcast regulation "' dictate that, in order to obtain FCC adoption,
any regulations proposed for the industry must foster, or at least
take account of, that motivation." 2 AAD achieves this.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
See Geller, supra note 87, at 18-34.
See note 79 supra.
See text accompanying notes 91-95 supra, and note 92 supra.
47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
Rosenbloom, Authority of the Federal Communications Commission,
in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBUATY iN BRoADcAsTjNG 96, 120-21, 148-51 (J.
Coons ed. 1961); CBS v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105-09

(1973).
110. EcoNoac ASPEcTS, supra note 78, at 16-18.
111. See generally E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, Tap, PoLrrcs OF BROADCAST REGULATION (1973).

112. A proposal to obtain diversity by re-instituting the sustaining program
requirement is unrealistic in its expectation that the FCC will impose such

1976]

9BALANCED PROGRAMMING

The benefit to the licensee from AAD is that the quota'for public
affairs programming 1 3 can be achieved rapidly and profitably if a
popular show in that category can be developed. Not' only can a
licensee accumulate the requisite number of vi6wer hours more
quickly with a popular show, but the increased popularity also
means a corresponding decrease in' the number of broadcast hours
which must be devoted to that category. The broadcast time thus
freed from public affairs programs can be filled with more popular
entertainment programs, and such programming, even when scheduled in the odd hours presently occupied by public affairs shows,
may well attract substantially larger audiences and advertising
revenue than did the shows scheduled at the same hour prior to the
adoption of AAD.
The profitability of broadcasting public affairs programming in
prime time in an effort to maximize viewer hours is unlikely to be
as substantial as what could be realized by broadcasting entertainment programming at the same hour," 4 but such scheduling can
be profitable, 1 5 even if not maximally so. And any decrease in
profits due to broadcasting public affairs in prime time may be more
than offset by an increase in profits realized from the availability of
more broadcast hours for entertainment programs than are available under the present regulations.
From the viewer's perspective, AAD will produce improved
program quality based on greater program expenditures while at
the same time making such programs more accessible in the broadcast schedule. The improved programming produced by this
increased expenditure" 86 will attract a larger audience (and thus
a financially disadvantageous burden on the industry. See Comment, Diversity
in Television Program Content: A Proposal for Sustaining Programming, 7
COLUm. J.

LAw & SociAL PROB.

319 (1971).

113. Although the recurring example of diversity used here is public affairs
programming, AAD is designed to foster balance in all program categories, including entertainment subcategories. See discussion in note 91 supra.
114. See EcoNoMIc AsPEcTs, supra note 78, at 12 table 1-4.
115. The CBS program "60 Minutes" is broadcast at 7 p.m. (E.S.T.) on
Sundays and maintains a healthy rating and audience share. BROADCAScING,
Jan. 19, 1976, at 46. See also McGowan, & Peck, Television: Theories, Facts
and Policies-Discussion,61 Am. EcoN. REv. 94, 97-99 (1971).
116. One study found that the number of hours per week of (1) all nonentertainment programming, (2) news and public affairs, and (3) all local
programming, are all "positively related to revenues.' R.. Park, Television
Station Performance and Revenues 14 (published by The Rand Corporation,
P-4577, 1971). "[Slurely there is a strong general tendency for higher cost
local programming to be better local programming." Id. at 8.
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more advertising revenue), thereby generating more viewer hours
and greater first amendment diversity in fewer broadcast hours.
The major argument against AAD is that viewers will simply
tune out unappealing prime time programs and either watch something more appealing on another station or not watch at all. The
reply to this argument is twofold. First, the "prime time audience
has been remarkably stable for at least two decades, staying within
two or three percentage points of 60 percent of television households
-this in the face of big changes in programming, a large increase
in the number of reruns, and the advent of color TV." 117 The
result of this relative constancy will be that a licensee's audience loss
at one time will be its gain and a competitor's loss at another time.
The networks will counterprogram each other with even more
sophistication and competitiveness than they do now, for they will
be matching each other in several program categories (and perhaps
in entertainment subcategories as well), not simply in general
entertainment.
Second, the quality of the less appealing program categories will
be upgraded by broadcasters in order to take maximum advantage
of the viewer hour incentive built into the AAD proposal. While
some now-contented viewers will tune out, some present nonviewers and less contented viewers will tune in.118 Presumably all
licensees in a given market will benefit to the extent there is a net
gain in the prime time audience because of the diversity and improved quality fostered by AAD.'1
117. R. Park, New Television Networks 5 (published by The Rand Corporation, R-1408-MF, 1973).
118. A recent Rand Corporation study concluded:

The most striking empirical finding is the discovery of a significant
number of households who do not watch standard programming but
joined the television audience when the Watergate hearings were
shown.... The existence of such a group establishes that the observed "constancy" of total television audience is the result of the programming normally available rather than of "passive" preference
of audiences who will watch anything. As a resul, the prospects for

the successful introduction of new programming are brighter than
would be the case if a fixed audience were dividedamong one or more
additional stations.

J. Besen & B. Mitchell, Watergate and Television: An Economic Analysis 39
(published by The Rand Corporation, R-1712-MF, 1975).
119. If a given market is less competitive-for example, two VHF network
affiliated stations rather than three-it can be argued that a licensee broadcasting a less popular program category in that market will lose fewer viewers
because there are fewer viewing alternatives. This argument depends on the
"LOP" theory, that "audiences watch TV whether they like what's on or not,

settling for 'the least objectionable program."'
Mar. 25, 1976, § C, at 6, cols. 1 & 2.

The Philadelphia Inquirer,

19761

BALANCED PROGRAMMING

A second argument against AAD is that in reality it is regulation
of broadcasters' profits, contrary to Section 3(h) of the Communications Act and broadcasting's long-standing status as a private
industry rather than a public utility. However, it is unlikely that
profits will be reduced by AAD. 1 20 Even if there were a reduction,
profits in the industry are so substantial, 121 and rising so swiftly
relative to other industries,'12 2 that some diminution in these profits
23
may be but small compensation for the "spectacular subsidy"

created by the government's giving away rather than selling broadcast licenses. In addition, overriding the profit-seeking interest of
the broadcasters is less significant than overriding their first amendment interests; indeed, whatever profit reduction may occur under
AAD will be more than outweighed by the great benefit to first
amendment diversity.
The third argument against AAD is simply-why? In the view
of most broadcasters, television is now fulfilling its promise as an entertainment and information medium, and those who argue for
greater diversity are an unrepresentative elite. Yet the industry's
evolution over the last fifteen years indicates that, in addition to the
124
benefits from diversity for those who already watch television,
those who will be attracted to the greater program diversity fostered
by AAD are a substantial minority rather than a minute elite. The

concentration of program control in the networks, the departure of
120. See text accompanying notes 108-16 supra. Interestingly, broadcasters
opposed the prime time access rule when it was first proposed. But when
the rule's result was to allow networks to drop their least profitable half-hours
of prime time programming without having to replace them, they were placated to say the least. See How TV Cashed in on a Court Ruling, BusiNEss
WEEK, Sept. 14, 1974, at 33. And, as would be the case with AAD, the FCC
was not dissuaded from adopting the prime time access rule by the novelty
of the regulations and their element of unpredictability. See Bryant, Historical
and Social Aspects of Concentration of Program Control in Television, 34 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 610, 634 (1969).
121. EcoNoMic AsPEcTs, supra note 78, at 16-18.
122. In commenting on the mix between broadcasting and nonbroadcasting
profits at CBS, William S. Paley, Chairman of the Board of CBS, observed:
"The only trouble is we tried to develop a formula where we would have
profits from nonbroadcasting amount to 50% of total profits. But this wasn't
taking into account the accelerated rate of the increase in broadcasting.
Broadcasting's gone up so fast it's made it very difficult for us to meet our
target." The Winning Ways of William S. Paley, BROADCASTING, May 31, 1976,
at 36. See also Merrill Lynch Is Also Bullish on Television, BROADCASTING,
Feb. 2, 1976, at 43; Wall Street Sees Big Year in Broadcast Profits, Prices,
BROADCASTING, May 17, 1976, at 21.
123. Kalven, supra note 91, at 31.
124. See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra, regarding the impact rationale for regulation of television.
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advertisers from program production and'sponsorship in favor of
spot advertising, the pressure for homogeneous programs which promote audience flow from one show to the next, and the resultant
intolerance of broadcasters and advertisers for any diverse, "disrup25
tive" program-all this is well documented and wfdely known.
The result is prompt banishment of shows which, although popular
and profitable, are not maximally so when compared to the competition.128 And this occurs even though the show may still have a
willing sponsor.127 This state of the industry, When considered with
the four regulatory rationales as interpreted here, argues for some
regulatory effort to increase the impact of the first amendment in
television programming.
C. AAD's Constitutionality
The final argument against AAD is that it unconstitutionally
infringes on the licensee's discretion as a journalist in violation of the
125. Barrow, supra note 95, at 634;-37, 641; Bryant, supra note 120, at
620-21, 627-29; Cohen, supra note 96; Comment, CoLuM. J. LAw & SocIAL
PROB., supra note 112, at 319-34; Comment, U.C.L.A.L. REv., supra note 91,
at 869-78. As Justice Brennan recently observed in dissent:
Indeed, in light of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing
their audience, and therefore their profits, it seems almost naive to
expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and controversiality of material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints. Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers and,
in the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply "bad
business" to espouse-or even allow others to espouse-the heterodox
or the controversial.
CBS v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973).
126. Advertisers pay "top dollars" only for the highest rated programs-and those seldom reach more than 20% of the potential audience. Yet, in subservience to this advertiser quirk, media owners
repeatedly abandon programs that please many millions more people
than the most widely circulated national magazines. In this unscientific process a program with a loyal, substantial audience may
be lost because it had the misfortune of competing with another
equally attractive program on another network, fractionalizing the
audience so that neither emerges with the magic ratings so vital to
advertisers. Yet the same program, against other competition,
might have produced more attractive "numbers" and survived.
Cohen, supra note 96, at 421.
127. But no one should be deluded into thinking that the networks will
agree to exhibit an advertiser-licensed program which promised to
attract significantly less than one-third of the total network audience
during prime time. The mere exhibition of such a series would reduce the value of all succeeding shows on that network during the
same evening because of the carryover effect of audiences in television.
Crandall, The Economic Effect of Television-Network Program "Ownership",
14 J. LAw & EcoN. 385, 395 (1971). See also Barrow supra note 95, at
635-36; Bryant, supra note 120, at 613 n.12.
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first amendment and Section 326 of the Communications Act. Reso-

lution of this recurring conflict in broadcast regulation requires that
a balance be struck between what the licensee "might prefer to do
as a private entrepreneur with what it is required to do as a 'public
trustee."1 28 Of all the FCC regulations for which this balance has
been struck in favor of the public interest, the prime time access
rule (PTAR)1 29 most closely resembles AAD in purpose and content. In National Association of Independent Television Producers
and Distributors v. FCC,130 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in upholding the constitutionality of the third version of
PTAR, found that PTAR's purpose "to encourage diverse sources of
programming and . . . diversity of programming" 13 ' outweighed
whatever first amendment interests may have been at stake for the
licensees.13 2 Just as PTAR does not require "any program or even
any type of program to be broadcast in access time," 13 3 neither does
AAD require specific program categories to be broadcast at specific
times, nor does AAD mandate content for particular program categories. In NAITPD the court bowed briefly and in rather stilted
fashion to Section 326 and the censorship issue: "The Commission
may not take from the licensee the ultimate control, and the ultimate
responsibility as well, for the actual content of particular programs
within the broad categories promulgated to serve the public interest." '4
Unlike PTAR, the Programming Statement and its regulations
have not been tested for constitutional validity in litigation. This
may be testimony either to their ineffectiveness or to their clear-cut
constitutionality. But if PTAR does not violate Section 326, then
neither will AAD. Just as each succeeding version of PTAR has
been a refinement of the original in pursuit of the goal of diverse
128. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973). In CBS,
the anti-access result was premised in part on the need to preserve licensee
discretion.
129. "The Prime Time Access Rule ... prohibits television stations in the
50 largest metropolitan areas from broadcasting network programs in more than
three of the four evening hours, 7 P.M. to 11 P.M., in which most people
watch television ('Prime Time') to allow the remaining hour ('Access Time')
to be available for independently created programs." National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers and Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 528 (2d
Cir. 1975).
130. 516 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975).
131. Id. at 528.
132. Id. at 536.
133. Id. at 537.
134. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
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programming, so AAD is but a refinement of the original balanced
programming regulations in *pursuit of that same goal.
D. AAD and the Regulatory Rationales
AAD's perception of balanced programming-through the eyes
of the viewer, not the program schedule of the licensee-finds ample
support in the four rationales for broadcast regulation. The scarce
resource rationale has always been applied to the electromagnetic
spectrum; but scarcity is also a fact of life in broadcasting's other
key resource-the hours in a day. Just as the government must allocate the spectrum between competing users, so it must allocate
the broadcast day between the competing needs and interests of
the viewing public.
The public interest rationale also supports regulation designed
to effect the AAD proposal. Notwithstanding surveys which indicate a taste among some viewers for more of the same in entertainment programming, 35 a significant number of households are tuned
out during prime time each evening. 38 Even after discounting for
the myriad reasons why a household might not watch television on a
particular evening, a substantial number of nonviewers (as well as
dissatisfied viewers) remain. Yet the Programming Statement interpreted its public interest premise as requiring a licensee to program for the needs and interests of all citizens in its service area on
an equitable basis.137 That requirement must include the substantial minority which has an ample appetite for greater variety in television's monotonous entertainment fare. 38 Professor Harry Kalven
135. ECONoMic AsPECTs, supra note 78, at 9 table 1-2.
136. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
137. Programming Statement at 2314.

In at least one recent ruling the

Commission seemed aware that to effect this Programming Statement principle,
it would have to move toward the AAD concept: "It is not a reasonable
scheduling practice to relegate all of the programming for children to Saturdays

and Sundays.

The Commission expects considerable improvement in schedul-

ing practices in the future." Action for Children's Television, 31 P & F RAo
REG. 2d 1228, 1229 (1974).
Similarly, a primitive version of AAD inter-

twines with the fairness doctrine: a key issue in the application of the fairness doctrine has been the frequency and timing of presentations of the opposing viewpoint on a controversial issue, since the viewer who has seen the
initial broadcast is unlikely to be watching when the reply is shown. See
Public Media Center v. Radio Station KATY, F.C.C. No. 76-453 (1976);
Westinghouse Broadcasting, Inc., KPIX-TV, 16 F.C.C.2d 1034, 1035 (1969);
Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 941-42 (1967), aff'd sub
nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
138. See J. Besen & B. Mitchell, supra note 118.
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appreciated, the market forces which have disenfranchised this minority and neatly summarized its plight:
[Broadcasting] is one market in which the consumer cannot
vote with dollars. It is not that advertising sponsorship is
evil because it is commercial; it is rather that its logic
necessarily seeks programs best for advertising results and
this means programs with the largest audiences. The upshot is that broadcasting, is programmed for the largest
common denominator and that minorities, who are able to
buy their way into other markets, are left out of this one
and complain. If there is a legitimate complaint about the
quality of programming, it is not that the quality is low but
that the programming is, among
American communications,
39
uniquely nonrepresentative.,
The impact rationale and the affimative-view-of-the-first-amendment rationale also buttress the AAD interpretation of balanced
programming. Far short of the "1984" hobgoblin, 40 regulations for
effective diversity can be seen as enriching the personal lives of individuals as well as their view of and role in society, thereby benefiting the polity.' 41 Diversity in.the average citizen's primetime
viewing fare will counter and diffuse the present impact of that
programming and further television's ability as a medium of speech
to fulfill the first amendment mandate for a "multitude of tongues."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Television's primary ill is almost universally diagnosed as a lack
of program diversity. The conflict is between those who advocate
139. Kalven, supra note 91, at 31-32. See also ECONoMIc ASPErs, supra
note 78, at 48.
140. This day [when we realize "that individuals are programmed to
behave with a set of values acquired primarily in very early youth,
and that even today the greatest input component to the formation of
these values is by electrical communications"] is probably not near because someone will first have to prove beyond a shadow of a
doubt (1) that our value system is acquired and not God-given,
(2) that it is very much subject to societal guidance through communications, and (3) that tampering with it is not as bad as leaving
it alone.
Baran, On the Impact of the New Communications Media Upon Social Values,
34 LAw & Couemvrp. PROB. 244, 247 (1969).
141. This is very much what Alexander Meiklejohn meant when he stated;
"Now, in that method of political self-government [where discussion of public
issues is promoted in order to have an informed electorate], the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers."
A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Covernment, in POLmICAL
FREEDOM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PowE OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1948).
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more regulation as the only mechanism for curing this ill, and those
who defend in the name of the first amendment the present system's
"abundance" and maintain that greater diversity in television's
speech can be achieved by less regulation. The problem for regulatory advocates is that broadcasting does, in fact, have some first
amendment status.1 42 However, in support of these advocates,
Section 326 of the Communications Act was apparently never intended to create a first amendment barrier to the FCC's regulation
of program quality and diversity.143 This is apparently also the
judicial view, for the courts have consistently found the Commission's programming regulations constitutional, despite the broadcasters' claim of first amendment infringement. 44 While regulations such as balanced programming 45 and the prime time access
rule'146 have been criticized as failing in their diversity goal and
possibly even promoting homogeneity, the courts have determined
that correction of these regulations' shortcomings rather than their
abandonment is the better means of furthering that goal.
To this end, the average audience distribution concept is proposed as a means of improving the balanced programming regulations' effectiveness in promoting diversity. This proposal is but another application of the precept that broadcasting must be interpre47
ted and regulated from the viewer's perspective.
Yet the question remains whether one more proposal for program
diversity will accomplish anything. Other proffered reforms have
been easily ignored, and perhaps justifiably so. Their implementation would not have cured the essential weakness in the present
regulations. AAD does cure this weakness by creating a new unit
of measurement-viewer hours- and by then using that unit as an
incentive for broadcasters to program more effective diversity in few142. See Kalven, supra note 91, at 32.
143. See Rosenbloom, supra note 109; Note, HAnv. L. REv., supra note 91,
at 715.

144. "[T]he general power of the F.C.C. to interest itself in the kinds of
programs broadcast by licensees has consistently been sustained by the courts
against arguments that the supervisory power violates the First Amendment."
National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers and Distribs. v. FCC, 516
F.2d 526, 536 (2d Cir. 1975).

145. See Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on
40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 Mnu-N. L. REv. 67, 124
(1967).
146. See Crandall, supra note 127, at 386.
147. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969).
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er broadcast hours with greater profits. To be sure, there will be
opposition from the broadcasting industry. But the next step for
AAD is to make it the subject of an FCC rulemaking. In that forum
the solidity of AAD's grounding in the first amendment and in the
four regulatory rationales will be apparent, and the details of its
implementation can be agreed upon.
These four rationales-scarce resource, public interest, impact,
and affirmative-view-of-the-first-amendment-have evolved with the
broadcasting industry: the growth of its prosperity and power has
begotten regulations, and these in turn have required rationales to
support them. AAD is simply an effective version of the balanced
programming regulations, well supported by the regulatory rationales.
AAD is a minor and palatable regulatory measure, the adoption
of which seems very much in the broadcasting industry's interest.
If AAD works, the industry will have gone a long way toward neutralizing some of its most virulent critics. If AAD is ignored, more
comprehensive and perhaps less palatable changes may be advanced
in an effort to fulfill the first amendent's mandate for diversity.

